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The Allocation of Effort under 
Uncertainty: The Case of 
Risk-averse Behavior 
M. K. Block 
Naval Postgraduate School 
J. M. Heineke 
University of Santa Clara 
This paper analyzes the labor supply decision of a single economic agent 
within the expected utility framework. Two formulations of the problem 
are considered: pure income uncertainty and wage rate uncertainty. In 
each case, the effects on the labor supply decision of changes in both 
expected returns and the dispersion of returns (about a constant mean) 
are investigated. Arguments concerning the "disincentive effects" of 
uncertainty are shown not to be unambiguously supported by theory. 
The pioneering work of Arrow ( 1965) in the theory of portfolio choice 
and the recent contributions of Leland ( 1968, 1971), Mossin ( 1968a, 
1968b), Sandmo (1969, 1970, 1971), Stiglitz (1969), and others clearly 
testify to the power of the expected-utility hypothesis in analyzing various 
problems of choice under uncertainty. But to our knowledge, a general 
analysis of the effects of uncertainty on the labor supply decision has yet 
to be done.1 In this paper we examine the labor supply decisions of a single 
economic agent in the expected utility framework. 
We consider two models and in each analyze the response of the labor 
supply decision to shifts in the subjective probability distribution of wages 
and/or income. In model I the individual's income contains a stochastic 
Received for publication November 19, 1971. Final version received March 14, 
1972. 
We are indebted to Hayne Leland, Gerald O'Mara, and Agnar Sandmo for their 
suggestions and criticisms. 
1 While some aspects of labor market uncertainty have been investigated in the job 
search literature (e.g., Mortensen 1970) and in Block and Reineke (1972a, 1972b), 
the traditional labor supply problem under uncertainty has not been analyzed. 
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component although the wage rate is deterministic; in model II the wage 
rate itself is stochastic. Attention is focused on the effects on labor supplied 
of changes in expected returns and the dispersion of returns about a 
constant mean. All results are distribution free. 
The following definitions will be used: L =the labor allocation, L;?: 0; 
w = the wage rate, w > 0, where w is a parameter in model I and a ran-
dom variable in model II; Y = total income in the period of analysis: 
Y0 =autonomous income, that is, income independent of labor force par-
ticipation; and U (L, Y) = the individual's von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function. 
In the work that follows, we assume that (i) income is a commodity 
( Uy > 0) and labor is a discommodity ( U L < 0), and (ii) the individual 
is risk averse ( U yy < 0) .2 As is well known, a general analysis of the 
allocation decision under uncertainty requires additional information about 
the agent's preferences. Elements of this situation are similar to those con-
fronting the investigator in most household decision problems. In the labor 
supply problem under conditions of certainty, assumptions (i) and (ii) are 
sufficient to sign only direct-substitution terms generated by changes in 
the wage rate; income effects remain unrestricted in the absence of further 
assumptions.3 Precisely the same statement applies to the stochastic ana-
logue of this problem, that is, the substitution and income terms generated 
by a change in the expected wage rate. In both the deterministic and 
stochastic case, signing income effects requires additional explicit second 
partial derivative information. 
In stochastic models, considerable attention is directed toward deter-
mining the effects of changes in the "amount of uncertainty" in the system. 
Such changes generate Slutsky-like expressions. Just as signing income 
terms (produced by changes in the wage rate or expected wage rate) 
requires more detailed information about preference orderings than does 
signing substitution effects, so does signing "income uncertainty effects" 
(produced by changes in the "amount of uncertainty") require more infor-
mation than does signing the "uncertainty substitution effect." The sign 
of the latter is determined merely by the agent's simple behavior toward 
risk; that is, whether he has a preference for risk is risk neutral or risk 
averse, while the former require some knowledge of third derivatives. 
An appealing method of providing this information is to postulate plausi-
ble hypotheses regarding the agent's behavior toward risk as various argu-
ments of the utility function change. For example, if utility is a function 
of income, a risk-averse individual may become less risk averse as his 
2 As usual, subscripts denote partial derivatives; e.g., Uy =aU jaY, UL = aUjaL, 
and ULy=azu;aLaY. 
3 Obviously, signing direct substitution terms requires only assumption (i). Assump-
tion (ii) is neither necessary for signing substitution terms nor sufficient for signing 
income terms. 
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income increases. This hypothesis, Arrow-Pratt decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, has been widely utilized and has yielded interesting results. How-
ever, as the recent work of Sandmo (1970, 1971) and Leland (1971) indi-
cates, this hypothesis alone does not provide sufficient information in the 
multicommodity case. 
Therefore, we begin by specifying a coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
in the multicommodity case, R(Y, L) = -Uyy/Ur, and assume this term 
is invariant to the agent's labor allocation and decreasing in income (the 
Arrow-Pratt hypothesis). Decreasing absolute risk aversion with respect to 
income implies that the individual becomes increasingly willing to accept a 
wager of a given size as his income increases, in the sense that odds de-
manded diminish. Arrow ( 1965) argues that both intuition and fact sup-
port this hypothesis. Intuitively, constant absolute risk aversion with 
respect to labor implies that the odds demanded by the individual for 
taking a risky action are not affected by how much he "works." Formally, 
(iii) aR;av < o and (iv) aR;aL = o. 
Assumptions (i)-(iv) and the traditional assumption (v) that in a 
certain world labor is an inferior commodity, 
(v) 
are sufficient for a distribution-free analysis of the labor allocation problem 
presented in models I and II.4 
Model I 
In this model we take the rate of return in the labor market to be certain 
but assume that income generated in the period contains a random com-
ponent which is distributed independently of the individual's labor supply 
decision. If A is an asset stock and x ;? -1 is the random rate of return 
on the asset stock, then the case of an individual who "works" and has an 
uncertain property income of Ax per period closely approximates this situ-
ation. Under these conditions, the individual's income opportunities are 
Y=wL+e, 
where e =Ax (=VO) and w is the known rate of return to labor. 
The Labor Supply Decision: Income Uncertainty 
The individual's labor supply decision is given by 
maxf_"'A U(L,wL+e)j(e)de,5 
L 
(1) 
(2) 
4 For convenience, we denote "certainty" as the case where all realizations of the 
random variable Y are equal to EY. 
5 This problem is formally equivalent to that explored by Sandmo (1970) in the 
section of his paper entitled "Income Risk." 
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subject to the condition 0 ~ L ~ l (Lis total time available) and solving 
for L.6 In (2), f(e) is the individual's subjective probability density and 
reflects the individual's beliefs as to the intervals in which e, property 
income, is likely to lie. The necessary condition for a relative maximum is 
(3) 
with the strict inequality holding in the case where the labor supply deci-
sion is L = 0. 
Only in very special cases will ( 3) reduce to the certainty decision rule. 
Obviously, if the individual's utility function is linear in income, expression 
(3) reduces to the traditional MRSn ~ w. One would expect that if an 
individual is risk neutral in income ( Uvv = 0), income uncertainty alone 
would not affect his decisions.7 Moreover, since the stochastic component 
of income is independent of L, ( 3) will also reduce to the certainty rule if 
the individual's utility function is quadratic. The labor decision rule above 
would then be an example of Theil's ( 1964) "certainty equivalence." 
The restrictive nature of both of these utility functions is well known. 
Risk neutrality clearly contradicts observed behavior, and as Arrow (1965) 
has emphasized, the assumption of a quadratic utility function, while ac-
counting for risk aversion, implies a serious contradiction of observed 
portfolio behavior. Therefore, if the present analysis is to account for the 
income implications of modern portfolio theory, ( 3) will not be immedi-
ately reducible to the certainty decision rule and the effects of uncertainty 
on the optimum allocation of labor will require explicit consideration. 
The Comparative Statics of Income Uncertainty8 
The second-order condition for a relative maximum is 
(4) 
The effect on labor supplied of a change in the expected value of e when 
all other moments about the mean are fixed may be investigated by replac-
ing e in ( 3) with e + fh, where 81 is a shift parameter, differentiating 
with respect to 81 and evaluating the result at 8t = 0. Thence, 
(5) 
Since all central moments of the distribution of e remain constant, a change 
in 81 is the stochastic counterpart of a neoclassical lump-sum income trans-
fer; and ( 5) is clearly negative by assumption ( v). That is, 
6 For simplicity we assume L < I, i.e., the "upper bound" constraint is nonactive. 
7 Note that behavior toward risk, while traditionally defined in terms of income, 
might also be defined in terms of the discommodity labor. Surely the individual can 
gamble with his labor input as well as income. 
8 In this section and in the comparative-static analysis that follows, we consider only 
internal solutions to the maximization problem. 
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( 5') 
Obviously, the inferiority of labor implies that increases in the expected 
return from "property" lead to decreases in labor supplied (or increases 
in leisure consumed). 
While mean-value shifts have received considerable attention in tradi-
tional analysis, the effect on the labor allocation of increased "uncertainty" 
in nonlabor income have not been adequately explored. The connection 
between "stability" and work incentives is often implied, but a formal 
framework appears to be lacking. As an initial step in this direction, we 
consider the effect of a change in the "amount of uncertainty" in nonlabor 
returns on the labor supply decision. 
Formally, changes in the "amount of uncertainty" may be interpreted 
as shifts in higher central moments of the distribution of e. Since, for 
arbitrary probability distributions, the variance of e may be an unsatisfac-
tory measure of dispersion, we follow the suggestion of Arrow ( 1965), 
since utilized by Sandmo (1969, 1970, 1971) and Leland (1971), and 
analyze the effects of a pure increase in dispersion by means of a multi-
plicative parameter shift followed by additive shift that leaves the mean 
unchanged.9 To proceed, replace e in (3) with y 1e + (} 2 , where y 1 and (}!'. 
are shift parameters. Since we desire E( e) to remain unchanged, dE( y 1e + 
{}z) = 0 and d(}2/dy 1 = -E(e) = -b, where E(e) = 1\. Differentiating 
( 3) with respect to Yt and evaluating the result at Yt = 1 and e2 = 0, 
we have 
(6) 
Expression ( 6) is the "income uncertainty effect" on labor supply of a 
pure dispersion change. 
In the discussion following equation ( 3) above, it is noted that if the 
individual's utility function is quadratic in income, the stochastic decision 
rule reduces to its "certainty equivalent" and hence uncertainty has no 
allocative effects. Equation ( 6) is a direct assessment of the allocative 
effects of uncertainty and yields in the case of a quadratic utility function 
the expected result that CJL/CJy1 = 0. 
For the more general case, assumptions (iii)-(v) imply that Un + 
wUyy is increasing in Y and thus cov(e, ULv + wUn) is positive.U 
Hence, 
9 For a discussion of this method of analyzing increases in uncertainty, see Leland 
(1970) and Sandmo (1970, 1971). An excellent discussion of alternative interpretations 
of increasing risk is given in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). 
lOWe have written aLjay1 as a covariance rather than as -E(ULY+wUyy) 
(e- b)/H, since it is possible to directly sign the covariance expression. 
11 To obtain this result, totally differentiate R with respect to L, noting aR;aL = 
a(-ULy/Uy)/aY for continuous functions. Since dR/dL is negative by (iii) and 
(iv), (v) implies a(ULY+wUn.)jaY>O. 
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( 6') 
Inequality ( 6') is a particularly intriguing result and indicates that the 
individual uses the labor market as a "hedge" against uncertainty. As the 
dispersion of nonlabor income increases, the individual compensates by 
increasing his expected income. While this appears to be a type of "self 
insurance," it is not a simple analogue of direct insurance. The inequality 
aLjay1 > 0 is an implication of the inferiority of labor and of a particular 
type of change in behavior toward risk as income and labor change, not an 
implication of behavior toward risk itself. In other words, direct insurance 
behavior is implied by risk aversion, but, as indicated above, risk aversion 
alone does not imply aLjay1 > 0. 
Model II 
As indicated at the outset, there has been a very limited concern with the 
explicit analysis of labor allocation under uncertainty. Institutional restric-
tions on the supply decision may account for some of this neglect, but it is 
an unconvincing argument in the light of the attention given to "incentive" 
or supply effects of tax schemes, etc., in a world of certainty.12 Perhaps it 
has been the intuitive feeling that in a fully employed economy the returns 
to labor are the most certain of factor returns. Nonetheless, as the results 
above indicate, even if the return to labor were certain, as long as some 
stochastic element is present in income, labor allocation decisions will 
depend on risk-taking behavior. Beyond this, we know that some occupa-
tions do have uncertain wage payments and that, more significantly, the 
degree of certainty involved in all wage payments is to some extent institu-
tionally determined. Random income taxes, random inflation, or the ab-
sence of property-rights enforcement would drastically alter the dispersion 
of returns to laborY A theory of labor allocation should be able to predict 
the effects of changes in institutional arrangements affecting the certainty 
of returns in the labor market. 
As an extention of the formal analysis of uncertainty and labor "incen-
tives," in this model we take the rate of return in the labor market to be a 
random variable. Income in the period is given by 
12 For example, see Cooper (1959) and Musgrave (1959); or for evidence of more 
recent concern, see Cassidy (1970). 
13 Traditional investigations (nonstochastic) of the effect of taxation on labor alloca-
tions, such as Cooper (1959) and Cassidy (1970), emphasize what are essentially mean-
value shifts in our model. As the discussion above indicates, there is an additional set 
of incentive questions associated with dispersion shifts. Clearly, there is an effect on 
labor allocation due to changes in the degree of certainty surrounding incidence. How-
ever, even if the tax is known with certainty, to the extent that the wage rate is 
stochastic, tax policy will have dispersion effects. In fact, changes in tax rates under 
these conditions will have both mean and dispersion effects. An intriguing area of 
further research is the extension of Mossin's (1968) and Leland's (1971) taxation 
analysis to the labor allocation problem. 
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Y= yo +wL. 
Formally, the individual's labor supply decision is determined by 
maxl,"' U(L, yo+ wL)f(w)dw, 
[L] o 
(7) 
(8) 
subject to 0:;:;:;; L:;:;:;; L.14 The function f(w) is the individual's subjective 
probability density on w. The first-order condition for a relative maximum 
is 
(9) 
Again, if utility were linear in income, (9) would reduce to the cer-
tainty decision rule: MRSYL;;? E(w). However, unlike model I, in this 
case quadratic utility will not yield "certainty equivalence" and has, as the 
discussion below indicates, rather special implications for the effects of 
wage uncertainty on labor allocation. 
The Comparative Statics of Wage-Rate Uncertainty 
Given an internal solution to ( 9), 
G- EU£[, + 2E(wUn) + E(w2Un) < 0 (IO) 
is sufficient for a relative maximum. The effect on labor supplied of changes 
in the expected wage rate may be ascertained in the same manner as above. 
If we let w = w + f)s, then 
aLja83 = -EUyjG- LE(U~oy + wUn)/G. (II) 
The first term is the substitution effect of a change in the expected wage 
rate and is obviously positive. The second term is the income effect of a 
change in the expected wage rate and, like equation ( 5) above, is negative 
by assumption (v). Consequently, if we accept the often employed assump-
tion that the labor supply function bends back on itself, (II) would 
generate the stochastic analogue of the neoclassical backward-bending labor 
supply function.15 
One interesting question remains: Can anything be said about the indi-
vidual's labor supply decision when the wage rate becomes more uncertain? 
We proceed as before and investigate a change in wage-rate dispersion 
about a constant mean. Substituting w = y2w + (} 4 into (9), differentiat-
ing with respect to y 2 [with d(} 4/dy2 = -E(w) in this case], and evaluat-
ing the derivative at y2 = 1, and (} 4 = 0, we have 
14 As before, we assume for simplicity L < L. 
15 For a recent study that uses this assumption, see Cassidy ( 1970). Formally, 
whether the supply function is backward bending or not is a question of whether or 
not there exists an L* <I such that (9) is maximum at L* (i.e., whether or not there 
exists an L* < L such that substitution effects dominate for L < L* and income effects 
dominate for L > L*). 
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aL;ay2 = -cov(Uy, w)/G- L cov (w, ULY + wUn)/G. (12) 
Since equation ( 12) is a Slutsky-like equation, we call the first term the 
"uncertainty substitution effect" and the second the "income uncertainty 
effect." This substitution effect measures the response of the individual's 
labor supply decision due solely to changes in wage-rate uncertainty. As is 
obvious from ( 12), and as would be expected, risk-averse behavior implies 
that this term is negative. The income uncertainty effect in equation ( 12) 
measures the response of the labor supply decision attributable solely to the 
increased income uncertainty implied by the increase in wage uncertainty. 
This term is analogous to equation ( 6) and is positive.16 
As indicated above, the income uncertainty result depends on the in-
feriority of labor and a particular set of assumptions concerning behavior 
toward risk as Y and L change. For example, if the utility function is 
quadratic, the income uncertainty effect will be zero. However, in the more 
general and empirically relevant case, increases in the dispersion of the 
wage rate induce the individual to supply more effort in an attempt to 
compensate for the additional income uncertainty.17 
Combining income and substitution effects, we see that changes in wage-
rate dispersion lack unambiguous incentive effects. Only through empiri-
cally dubious restrictions on the utility function does the ambiguity in (12) 
disappear. 
As ( 11) and ( 12) indicate, an increase in wage-rate dispersion has pre-
cisely the same qualitative effect on the labor supply decision as a de-
crease in the expected wage rate. The intuitive explanation is that risk-
averse individuals view increased wage uncertainty and decreases in mean 
wages as "costs" in the sense that each of these parameter shifts has the 
effect of lowering the chances that a realized wage rate will fall within 
some specified "acceptable" range. Hence, each shift leads to decreases in 
labor supplied in substitution terms and increases in labor supplied via 
income effects. 
Summary and Some Implications 
An intriguing implication of our analysis is that, contrary to often pro-
fessed beliefs, increased income uncertainty, under very reasonable assump-
tions, unequivocally brings about increases in labor force participation. 
However, when the increase in income uncertainty is generated by a change 
in the dispersion of a wage rate, more than income uncertainty must be 
16 The proof is entirely similar to that of (6) above. 
17 Unlike its implication in the previous model, a quadratic utility function now has 
allocative significance because of the nonzero substitution term; and an increase in 
wage dispersion \\ill always decrease the supply of effort. 
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considered. Since an individual can reduce uncertainty by substituting 
away from the activity, there is a substitution effect that moves in the 
opposite direction. It is the substitution effect that provides the theoretical 
underpinnings for statements about the "disincentive" effects of uncer-
tainty. 
It is now clear that arguments concerning the "disincentive" effects of 
uncertainty are not unambiguously supported by theory. In fact, increases 
in the dispersion of factor returns may, paradoxically, have strong incentive 
effects. As we have shown and as Sandmo ( 1970) had indicated in a 
different context, to the extent that uncertainty is not directly tied to the 
allocative decision risk-averse individuals will increase their productive 
efforts as uncertainty increases. Even in those cases where increases in 
dispersion are directly related to the allocative decision (wage-rate un-
certainty), the "disincentive" effects of increased uncertainty are not 
derivable from theoretical considerations alone.18 While the "uncertainty 
substitution effects" suggest a substitution away from the affected activity, 
one must have knowledge of relative magnitudes, since the "income un-
certainty effect" moves in the opposite direction and may either dominate 
or be dominated by the substitution effect. Therefore, under very plausible 
behavioral assumptions, the "conventional wisdom" of the importance of 
"stability" (the minimization of uncertainty) in factor returns is either a 
testable hypothesis about relative magnitudes or a normative statement. 
In a world of risk-averse individuals, it is true that costless decreases in 
the dispersion of returns is a Pareto-relevant action. But a fascinating im-
plication, in terms of positive analysis, of the particular set of behavioral 
assumptions employed in this paper is that public policy directed at re-
ducing uncertainty may have "disincentive" effects. And an appropriately 
designed increase in income uncertainty may be used as a policy instru-
ment for increasing the supply of labor, but it could not of course be 
defended with Pareto considerations. Risk-averse individuals lose as un-
certainty increases, and their factor reallocation is only a reaction to a less 
hospitable world. 
Our analysis of the labor decision and Sandmo's ( 1970) analysis of the 
savings decision both treat one aspect of the household decision in isola-
tion. An interesting avenue of further research is the integration of both 
decisions into a single model of household decision making in which the 
supply of labor and savings are jointly determined and both factor returns 
are stochastic.19 
18 That is, "distinctive" effects of increased uncertainty do not follow from risk 
aversion. 
19 For an extension of Sandmo (1970) to the joint labor-savings decision, see Block 
and Reineke ( 1972a). This paper utilizes relatively strong assumptions, some of which 
are relaxed in Block and Reineke (1972b). 
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